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ABSTRACT: 
While the Unified Approach reallocates taxing rights to market jurisdictions irrespective of 
the existence of any physical presence therein, such new taxing rights are subject to various 
qualifications and carve-outs. Concerns have already been raised that these scope limitations 
may complicate the reform and lead to double taxation. Ultimately, the issue of the scope 
limitation boils down to the policy rationale of the new taxing right for which this article 
submits a narrowly-construed benefit theory as a conceptual basis. Based on this benefit 
theory and relevant market theories, the authors argue that the scope limitations of the new 
taxing right should be based on the nature of transactions rather than the nature of products 
(services). In this way, various carve-outs proposed in the Unified Approach documents can 
be simplified to one business type, specifically, most of business-to-business (B2B) sales. 
Accordingly, a positive delineation of in-scope business can be drawn: business-to-consumer 
(B2C) sales and sales through routine-function intermediaries. Franchise arrangements also 
accord with the purpose of the new taxing right, however, franchise fees can be dealt with 
through the provisions of royalties in income tax treaties.   
Keywords: Unified approach, benefit principle, user participation, significant economic 
presence, consumer engagement, digitalization of the economy 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Since October 2019, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
has developed a Unified Approach (UA) to the nexus and profit allocation rules of taxation 
over cross-border business income, marking an important step towards the goal of addressing 
tax challenges arising from the digitalization of the economy.1 Compared with the traditional 
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tax rules on cross-border business income, the most revolutionary aspect of the UA concerns 
its tax concession to market jurisdictions. Specifically, certain taxing rights will be reallocated 
to market jurisdictions irrespective of the existence within those jurisdictions of any physical 
presence which, by contrast, is traditionally a key threshold for source taxation.2 Moreover, 
the UA purports to develop a simplified and administrable approach to the new taxing right by 
adopting a three-tier profit allocation mechanism whereby profit that is attributable to a 
market jurisdiction is simplified to Amount A, Amount B, and Amount C.3  
However, concerns have already been raised that the goal of simplifying the application of the 
new taxing right may be compromised by various scope limitations imposed on the UA. 
Among others, several business sectors such as agricultural and industrial products are carved 
out from the UA scope.4 A related concern is that the interpretation of these carve-outs may 
give rise to a soaring volume of disputes should the UA ultimately be approved and 
implemented by countries. Moreover, a question may also arise as to what the policy rationale 
is for limiting the UA scope in the first place.5 All of these nuisances indicate the need for a 
more systematic and holistic approach to the understanding of UA and its scope of application. 
It is true that ‘Ultimately, the question of scope is a political question’.6 Nevertheless, 
political consensuses based on principled reasoning can at least achieve a greater degree of 
legitimacy and acceptability as opposed to, for example, blatant horse-trading. In this 
connection, this article seeks to holistically and theoretically elucidate the new taxing right 
and its scope. In particular, an interdisciplinary approach that combines the theories of both 
taxation and marketing will be employed. The article will be structured as follows. 
Section 2 contains an overview of the UA with a focus on the scope of the new taxing right. 
Section 3 explores the policy rationale for the new taxing right and its scope limitations. 
Section 4 focuses on analysing several specific issues regarding the limits of the new taxing 
right. The section ends with recommending a positive delineation – rather than negative 
carve-outs – of the UA scope. Section 5 concludes. 
2. OVERVIEW OF THE UA AND ITS SCOPE LIMITATIONS 
2.1 Outline of the UA 
 
2 OECD, Secretariat Proposal for a “Unified Approach” under Pillar One, supra n. 1, at 5, para. 15. 
3 See infra s. 2.1. 
4 OECD, Secretariat Proposal for a “Unified Approach” under Pillar One, supra n. 1, at 7, para. 20. 
5 See infra s. 2.3. 
6 Report by ADE TAX, from OECD, Public Comments Received on the Secretariat Proposal for a “Unified 
Approach” under Pillar One (15 Nov. 2019) available at  
https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/public-comments-received-on-the-secretariat-proposal-for-a-unified-approach-unde
r-pillar-one.htm (accessed 3 Jul. 2020). 
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The UA was first released in the Secretariat Proposal for a ‘Unified Approach’ under Pillar 
One (October 2019, hereinafter the Secretariat Proposal) for seeking comments from the 
public. Based on the inputs from the public and the follow-up work since the release of the 
Secretariat Proposal, the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (BEPS) (hereinafter Inclusive Framework or IF) endorsed the UA in the Statement by 
the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS on the Two-Pillar Approach to Address the 
Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalization of the Economy (January 2020, hereinafter IF 
Statement).7 According to the UA, three types of profit may be allocated to a market 
jurisdiction:8 
Amount A: a share of residual profit allocated to market jurisdictions irrespective of the 
existence of physical presence within those jurisdictions;9   
Amount B: a fixed remuneration based on the arm’s length principle for baseline distribution 
and marketing functions that take place in the market jurisdiction;10 and  
Amount C: any additional profit for in-country functions that exceed the baseline activity 
covered by Amount B.11 
It could be considered that, among the above three types of profit allocation, only Amount A 
epitomizes the new taxing right whereas Amount B and Amount C are based on the existing 
transfer pricing rules with an emphasis on physical presence deployed by multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) in source states.12 
2.2 Scope of the new taxing right 
The scope of Amount A is subject to a number of limitations. First, the application will be 
limited to MNE groups that meet a certain gross revenue threshold. This is to avoid 
unnecessary compliance costs for smaller businesses.13 Second, it is further required that the 
business in scope must have developed sustained and significant engagement with a market 
jurisdiction. According to the UA documents, this engagement requirement largely confines 
the application of Amount A to two broad sets of businesses: automated digital services and 
 
7 OECD, Secretariat Proposal for a “Unified Approach” under Pillar One, supra n. 1; OECD, Statement by the 
OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS on the Two-Pillar Approach to Address the Tax Challenges Arising 
from the Digitalization of the Economy, supra n. 1, at 4-5, para.1-7. 




12 OECD, Statement by the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS on the Two-Pillar Approach to Address the 
Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalization of the Economy, supra n. 1, at 8, para. 11. 
13 Ibid. at 12, para. 35. 
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consumer-facing businesses.14 The provision of automated digital services typically involves 
exploiting data or content contributed by customers/users. Hence, their abilities to engage a 
foreign market in an active and sustained manner are rather of general applicability.15 It 
follows that for this set of businesses, the mere generation of above-threshold revenue in a 
market jurisdiction over a period of years is taken in the UA as a sufficient nexus for the 
jurisdiction to apply the new taxing right.16 
In contrast, the situation of consumer-facing businesses is more complicated. On the one hand, 
this type of business is more traditional than digital automated services and, therefore, implies 
a lower level of digitalization. On the other hand, the growing use of advanced technologies 
has increasingly enabled these businesses to interact and engage with their customer bases 
remotely but aggressively.17 Accordingly, for consumer-facing businesses, while a revenue 
threshold will remain to be the primary evidence of the sustained and significant engagement, 
further ‘plus’ evidence is warranted, e.g. MNEs’ deployment of physical presence in or 
targeted advertising directed at the market jurisdictions.18  
Third, the following business sectors or models are regarded as being less likely to engage the 
consumer base in an active and sustained manner and, therefore, carved out from the scope of 
Amount A. 
 Extractive industries (e.g. extraction of a nation’s natural resources), agricultural 
industries, and businesses of raw material;19  
 Businesses selling intermediate products and components that are incorporated into a 
finished product;20 and 
 Most of the activities of the financial services sector.21     
Lastly, several other business types, though tentatively recognized as in-scope businesses, 
have been highlighted by the UA documents for further consideration. For instance, the 
Secretariat Proposal submits that further discussion is needed to clarify whether the 
consumer-facing business includes the supply of goods and services through intermediaries 
and the use of franchise arrangements.22  
 
14 Ibid. at 9-10, paras 17-19. 
15 Ibid. at 9-10, para. 18. 
16 Ibid. at 13, para. 38. 
17 Ibid. at 10, para. 19. 
18 Ibid. at 13, para. 39. 
19 Ibid. at 11, para. 30. 
20 Ibid. at 11, para. 26. 
21 Ibid. at 11, para. 31. 
22 OECD, Secretariat Proposal for a “Unified Approach” under Pillar One, supra n. 1, at 7, para. 20. 
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2.3 Concerns about the scope limitations 
Concerns have already been raised that various limitations on the scope of Amount A may 
considerably complicate the UA. Indeed, during the consultation process upon the release of 
the Secretariat Proposal, the vast majority of stakeholders expressed their worries that the 
application of these scope limitations may become a major source of tax disputes.23 Above all 
is the primary concern related to the ambiguity around the concept of consumer-facing 
business and consumer engagement.24 As the representative from Amazon articulated in their 
comment, ‘We consider that a solution that applies to “consumer facing" businesses will be 
too ambiguous, will create numerous boundary issues and would likely lead to disputes both 
between taxpayer and tax authority, and between tax authorities themselves.’25  
Several carve-outs of the consumer-facing business are particularly contentious. For instance, 
many doubted the soundness of the exclusion regarding intermediate products and 
components, arguing that certain commodities can be sold both as components and as finished 
products.26 Several pharmaceutical companies raised a similar nuisance: while the drugs sold 
by the companies are doubtlessly consumed by final consumers, they are prescribed by 
medical institutions and doctors to individual patients. Therefore, it is unclear whether the 
pharmaceutical industry falls within or beyond the consumer-facing business.27  
There are also significant calls for the further clarification of the carve-out in relation to sales 
through intermediaries as multitudes of MNEs may engage in both business-to-business (B2B) 
and business-to-consumer (B2C) sales.28 Sales through B2B channels may also increase the 
difficulty of tracking the locations of final consumers – after all, the application of the new 
tax right is conditioned upon the MNE’s active and sustained engagement with large 
consumer bases in a market jurisdiction.29      
Being aware of the vagueness of the carve-outs, many contend that the new taxing right 
 
23 OECD, Public comments received on the Secretariat Proposal for a ‘Unified Approach’ under Pillar One, 
supra n. 6. 
24 For example, see comments from AB Volvo, Accountancy Europe, Business Roundtable, Business Europe, etc. 
Ibid. 
25 Comments from Amazon, Ibid. 
26 See comments from AB Volvo, Afep, etc. Ibid. 
27 INSIGHT: Fortune 500 Speak Out on Unified Approach, ICRICT, available at 
https://www.icrict.com/icrict-in-thenews/2019/12/14/insight-fortune-500-speak-out-on-unified-approach (accessed 
23 May 2020). 
28 For example, see comments from ADE Tax, American Chamber of Commerce Iceland, Afep, Business at 
OECD, etc., OECD, Public comments received on the Secretariat Proposal for a ‘Unified Approach’ under Pillar 
One, supra n. 6; See also INSIGHT, supra n. 27. 
29 For example, see comments from ADE Tax, Alliance for Competitive Taxation, etc. OECD, Public comments 
received on the Secretariat Proposal for a ‘Unified Approach’ under Pillar One, supra n. 6. 
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should apply equally to all industries and business models.30 More fundamentally, some 
doubt if there is any merit to limit the UA scope in the first place: ‘if Amount A is to be 
thought of more in terms of a market access fee, that it should be extended to all businesses 
that sell into more than one country—not just consumer-facing businesses—and regardless of 
size of business’.31 
Conversely, some quested whether the carve-outs that are instituted in the UA are sufficiently 
conclusive. For example, some maintained that the carve-outs should be extended to all B2B 
transactions.32     
To be sure, it is not unusual to see various legal principles and rules being subject to 
numerous exceptions which can be well justified insomuch as they serve legitimate purposes 
and are structured in a consistent and coherent fashion. The question is that, as one 
stakeholder points out, without a clear understanding of the policy rationale behind the new 
taxing right, it would be challenging to judge the appropriateness of excluding certain 
businesses from the UA scope, particularly considering the ever-evolving business models.33  
3. CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR THE NEW TAXING RIGHT AND ITS SCOPE 
LIMITATIONS 
3.1 Overview 
Ultimately, the question about the UA scope culminates into the policy rationale underlying 
the allocation of taxing rights among countries. Unfortunately, this theoretical aspect has been 
somewhat overlooked in the UA documents partly because it was built on a preceding saga in 
which the issue of rationale had already been briefly discussed on several occasions.34 
Specifically, the UA was based on three immediate predecessors, namely, ‘user participation’, 
‘marketing intangibles’, and ‘significant economic presence’ proposals, all of which support 
some tax concession to market jurisdictions.35 Therefore, it is beneficial to make a brief 
review of the policy rationales for these proposals. 
 User participation proposal: the basic idea is that the activities and participation of the 
 
30 See comments from Accountancy Europe, American Chamber of Commerce in Italy, Borioli & Colombo 
Associati, etc. Ibid. 
31 INSIGHT, supra n. 27. 
32 See comments from American Chamber of Commerce in Belgium, American Chemistry Council, Public 
comments received on the Secretariat Proposal for a “Unified Approach” under Pillar One, supra n. 6. 
33 Comments from BDO Ibid. 
34 For milestone OECD documents on Action 1, see OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation 
of the Economy, Public Consultation Document 13 Feb. 2019 – 6 Mar. 2019 (OECD Publishing 2019); OECD, Tax 
Challenges Arising from Digitalisation, Interim Report (OECD Publishing 2018); OECD, Addressing the Tax 
Challenges of the Digital Economy, Action 1 Final Report 1 (OECD Publishing 2015). 
35 OECD, Secretariat Proposal for a “Unified Approach” under Pillar One, supra n. 1, at 3, para.4. 
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users in a market jurisdiction contribute to the creation of the brand and the generation of 
valuable data for a foreign MNE. Therefore, market jurisdictions deserve some taxing 
rights over in-country businesses carried on by MNEs. The proposal is mainly applicable 
to automated digital services such as social media platforms, search engines, and online 
marketplaces.36     
 Marketing intangibles proposal: this proposal highlights the ‘intrinsic link’ between the 
market intangibles developed by MNEs and the market jurisdictions. According to this 
proposal, a brand name may be reflected in the favourable attitudes in the minds of 
consumers. Other market intangibles such as customer data and customer relationships 
are also derived from the activities targeting the customers/users in market jurisdictions. 
This proposal has the widest scope of application including not only automated digital 
services but also consumer-facing businesses.37 
 Significant economic presence proposal: this proposal is motivated by the observation 
that digitalization has enabled business enterprises to be heavily involved in the 
economic life of a jurisdiction without any significant physical presence. Based on this 
rationale, this proposal is mainly focused on businesses through online channels.38  
The above three proposals all reveal certain types of connection between MNEs and the 
relevant market jurisdictions in the context of digitalization. Nonetheless, further articulation 
is needed to establish that such ‘connection’ justifies the tax concession to market 
jurisdictions. After all, due to economic globalization and the information revolution, the 
entire world has been integrated into a ‘global village’.  
Comparatively, the user participation proposal appears to be more attractive as the value 
creation principle – i.e. profits should be taxed where value is created – has been enshrined as 
the bedrock underlying the entire BEPS Project.39 Nevertheless, the principle is, at best, a 
temporary resting place for the inquiry about tax justice as a further query can always be 
raised about how the process of value creation justifies a taxing right assigned to the place 
hosting the process. After all, in the business or management world from which tax lawyers 
borrowed the concept of value creation, those who create value and those who capture it are 
not necessarily the same.40 There are numerous other challenges facing the user participation 
 
36 OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy (2019), supra n. 34, at 9-10, 
paras18-19. 
37 Ibid. at 11-12, paras 29-32. 
38 Ibid. at 16, paras 50, 51. 
39 OECD, What is BEPS, available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/about/ (accessed 1 Oct. 2019). 
40 D.P. Lepak, K.G. Smith & M.S. Taylor, Value Creation and Value Capture: A Multilevel Perspective, 32(1) 
Academy of Management Review 180, 187-190 (2007). 
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proposal that will be revisited later.41  
3.2 Benefit theory 
3.2.1 ‘Quid pro quo’ 
The critical review in the above subsection indicates a need for a more fundamental 
conceptual basis for the allocation of taxing rights among countries. These authors propose a 
traditional principle in international taxation, namely, the benefit principle, as an ideal 
candidate for the theoretical construction. This principle provides that taxes should be paid 
where the business would typically avail itself of the public services provided by the state.42 
The principle corresponds to the common understanding of taxation in a more general sense, 
namely, taxes are the price paid by citizens collectively for the public goods provided by a 
state.43 More importantly, the principle can be traced to the idea of reciprocity or quid pro 
quo that is so true and natural to human instinct.44  
To be sure, the benefit theory was once declined as a proper basis for policy debate and rule 
design in the early history of international taxation. Specifically, the four economists who 
were appointed by the League of Nations in the early 1920s to study the issue of double 
taxation considered that the benefit theory had been supplanted by the theory of ability to pay 
as a basic principle of taxation.45 In contrast, they identified the concept of economic 
allegiance as a preferable basis to design the international tax framework. Based on this 
concept, taxes should be paid where businesses develop the greatest degree of economic 
allegiance.46 However, as several contend, the choice between the benefit theory and the 
theory of ability to pay is mostly a domestic tax issue for which the calculation of tax 
liabilities and the promotion of individual equity are critically concerned. 47 Therefore, the 
theory of ability to pay by no means diminishes the value of benefit theory in the debate in an 
international tax context. Moreover, the theory of economic allegiance faces the same 
challenge as with the three proposals discussed above, i.e. the concept cannot be taken as a 
self-sufficient basis for nexus rules. Indeed, even the four economists occasionally slipped to 
 
41 See infra s. 3.2.3. 
42 OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy (2015), supra n. 34, at 25-26, para. 32; J. Becker 
& J. Englisch, Taxing Where Value Is Created: What’s ‘User Involvement’ Got to Do With It?, 47(2) Intertax, 162 
(2020). 
43 K. Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income-A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part III), 
11(16) Intertax, 393, 395 (1988). 
44 E. Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence: The Philosophy and Method of the Law 232 (Harvard University Press 1981). 
45 OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy (2015), supra n. 34, at 24-25, para. 28; 25-26, 
para. 32. 
46 Ibid. at 24-25, para.28. 
47 Vogel, supra n. 43, at 395; OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy (2015), supra n. 34, 
at 26, para.32. 
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the benefit account. At one place in their report, they quested: “how, then, should the sum that 
[the person] finally pays reach these several governments which render him service?”48  
3.2.2 Benefit theory and the taxation of business income 
The benefit theory has been playing an overarching role in the policy debate of international 
taxation in the past century.49 In particular, it is widely believed that the theory shapes the 
taxing rule over cross-border business income with which the UA is concerned. Specifically, 
Article 7 (business profits) of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
(OECD Model Convention) provides that a state cannot tax a foreign enterprise on its 
business income unless the enterprise conducts business via a permanent establishment (PE) 
situated in the state.50 The requirement of a PE as the threshold for source taxation reflects 
the idea that, as long as a foreign enterprise obtains no benefit of public infrastructure and 
other public goods from a country, no contribution to the costs of those public goods should 
be expected from that enterprise.51 The problem, however, is that the development of 
information and communication technologies have enabled firms to carry out large scale 
businesses in market jurisdictions without the need of deploying a PE or any other type of 
substantial physical presence therein. In this context, some suggest, with whom these authors 
concur, that large consumer bases in market jurisdictions also constitute a type of benefit 
vis-à-vis non-resident enterprises.52 Unlike those physical benefits that necessitate a certain 
degree of geographical proximity between a beneficiary (an enterprise) and a service provider 
(the host country), consumer bases can be exploited remotely. This particular quality of 
demand-side benefits justifies the new taxing right reallocated to market jurisdictions without 
resorting to the existence of physical presence.53 That being said, the idea of benefit from 
consumer bases is not free from challenge, not in the least because, traditionally, benefits in 
tax context primarily refers to public services provided by a government. After all, as 
mentioned previously, tax is the collective price paid for public goods. In this connection, 
some propose a custodian account of benefit theory.54 Specifically, while it can never be said 
that the government of a market jurisdiction creates the consumer base, the state can act as a 
custodian for its own citizens and accordingly tax foreign businesses for their exploitation of 
 
48 League of Nations, Report on Double Taxation: Document E.F.S.73. F.19 18 (1923). 
49 Becker and Englisch, supra n. 42, at 162. 
50 OECD Model Conventon (2017), Art.7 (1).  
51 K. Holmes, International Tax Policy and Double Tax Treaties: An Introduction to Principles and Application 
20-21 (2nd ed., IBFD 2014). 
52 Q. Cai, L. Cerioni & X. S. Li, New Taxing Right in the Unified Approach: Old Wine in a New Bottle, 48(11) 
Intertax  962 (2020); Becker and Englisch, supra n. 42, at 170-171. 
53 Cai, Cerioni & Li, supra n. 52, at 962. 
54 A. Aslam & A. Shah, Tec (h) Tonic Shifts: Taxing the “Digital Economy” 23 (International Monetary Fund 
2020). 
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the consumer base situated in the state.55 The same logic also applies to the case of natural 
resources where governments typically hold the resources located within their territories in 
trust on behalf of their citizens and collect payment for extraction in the form of government 
revenues.56    
3.2.3 Benefit theory in the UA documents 
Indeed, the IF Statement makes several references to the concept of benefit. When justifying 
the inclusion of automated digital services in the UA scope, the document explains that these 
businesses ‘generally benefit from exploiting powerful customer or user network effects and 
generate substantial value’ and that they ‘often benefit from data and content contributions 
made by users and from the intensive monitoring of users’ activities and the exploitation of 
corresponding data’.57 It is worth noting that, while the user participation proposal also places 
significant emphasis on the ideal of user data, content contribution, and network effect, the 
proposal and the underlying value creation principle lend little clarification to the policy 
debate. For example, some contend that the value of digital businesses is indeed created by 
companies rather than users, and hence the profit concerned should be taxed by the resident 
countries of those companies instead of market jurisdictions. This is because users generate 
content or data largely for their own entertainment, and it is those digital companies that mine 
those data in an entrepreneurial manner.58 By contrast, from the benefit perspective, users 
always lie with the market jurisdictions regardless of the place of value creation.     
Another major criticism against the user participation proposal relates to its emphasis on 
active user contribution. This reflects a postulation that value can only be created in the 
production process or the supply side rather than the demand side.59 The upshot is that the 
proposal rather ‘ring-fences’ those highly digital businesses and thus is sometimes dubbed as 
‘Google Tax’.60 In contrast, from the perspective of the benefit theory, the large consumer 
bases in market jurisdictions also constitute qualified benefits for tax purposes even though 
these consumers may not be as active in terms of user contribution as their counterparts 
consuming automated digital services. 
3.3 Qualification of the benefit theory  
 
55 Ibid. at 23. 
56 Ibid. at 23. 
57 OECD, Statement by the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS on the Two-Pillar Approach to Address the 
Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalization of the Economy, supra n. 1, at 9-10, para.18. 
58 Becker and Englisch, supra n. 42, at 167-170. 
59 M. P. Deveraux & J. Vella, Taxing the Digitalised Economy: Targeted or System-Wide Reform? 4 British Tax 
Review 387, 394 (2018). 
60 R. Neate, What Is the ‘Google Tax’? The Guardian, (29 Sept. 2014), available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/sep/29/what-is-google-tax-george-osborne (accessed 3 Jul. 2020). 
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Considering the above strength of the benefit theory, oddities may arise immediately. Now 
that the theory is so established and meritorious, it seems rather groundless for tax lawyers to 
make such a fuss about the tax challenges of the digitalization since a market jurisdiction can, 
by all means, tax foreign exporting companies on the grounds that those companies benefit 
from its market accesses. Accordingly, the requirement of sustained and significant 
engagement as a prerequisite for the tax concession to market jurisdictions becomes rather 
redundant. Going further, it would not be necessary for Article 7 of the OECD Model to 
condition source taxation upon the existence of a PE in the source state as long as the 
cross-border business is directed to the source state. Indeed, this broad version of the benefit 
theory does find support in several recent academic initiatives on the reform of international 
tax rules, such as the cash flow tax and the destination-based tax. Both initiatives propose 
assigning the taxing right over business income to countries where consumers reside.61  
The reality, however, is that most scholars and policymakers are very cautious when 
recognizing mere market accesses as a qualified nexus for the allocation of taxing rights. 
Since the early history of international taxation, the greatest importance has been attached to 
the nexus between business income and the physical places contributing to the production of 
the income.62 As the OECD interim report on the BEPS Action 1 observes, a majority of the 
countries reject the idea that market access alone provides a sufficient link to create a nexus 
for tax purposes.63  
Arguably, this cautious attitude towards the nexus solely based on market access is somehow 
associated with the ideology of trade liberty that has been so embedded in the mind of 
theorists and policymakers.64 For many of them, taxes solely based on market accesses would 
amount to an overt restriction on free trade just as with tariffs. In these authors’ view, even 
disregarding this ideological consideration, a well-formulated benefit theory would still reject 
the creation of tax nexuses solely based on market accesses. This is not to deny the value of 
market accesses as a benefit for MNEs – they are indeed very essential to the success of 
international commerce. Nevertheless, both source taxation and the new taxing right for 
market jurisdictions can be justified only if and when a significant degree of public resources 
provided by countries is exploited by businesses in an active and sustained manner. 
Otherwise, the benefit theory will become a theory of hollowness as the entire world in this 
 
61 Deveraux and Vella, supra n. 59, at 404-405. 
62 OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy (2015), supra n. 34, at 25, para.30. 
63 OECD, Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation (2018), supra n. 34, at 172, para.390. 
64 For example, concerns have been raised that the proposal of destination-based taxation may contravene 
international trade law such as WTO rules. IMF, IMF Policy Paper: Corporate Taxation in The Global Economy 9 
(2019). 
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era of global village has become increasingly interconnected and interdependent. If mere 
access to a market can create a nexus for tax jurisdiction, perhaps countries that are home to 
certain strategic resources can also claim a similar type of taxing right over MNEs that have 
purchased these resources in bulk. In that way, a tax jurisdiction would be expanded almost 
infinitely, and the international tax system may collapse. By contrast, most countries in the 
real world tax or collect royalty (or license) fees only from businesses that actively engage in 
mining their natural resources rather than businesses that merely purchase the resources. This 
narrowly construed benefit theory justifies the requirement of sustained and significant 
engagement that qualifies the UA scope. It might be questioned if such consumer engagement 
is really separable from the benefit of market access. Later in this article, these authors will 
demonstrate that the distinction between the two is feasible and even observable.65  
Unfortunately, this threshold element of the benefit theory has seldom been articulated in the 
past discussions on the theory. Indeed, the Action 1 Final Report avers that, under the benefit 
theory, benefits ‘can be specific or general in nature’.66 This somehow leads to an impression 
that mere market accesses also qualify as a sufficient benefit for tax purposes, although this 
impression contradicts the OECD’s own position, as was discussed above. As a result, the 
mainstream account of the benefit theory delivers a rather contradictory picture. On the one 
hand, little attention has been paid to the qualifications of the benefit theory. On the other 
hand, however, treaty practice (e.g. treaty rules on the taxation over business income) and 
policy proposals (e.g. the user participation proposal) unduly confine the scope of benefits to 
some physical goods in relation to the supply side of businesses.  
3.4 Consumer engagement: insights from market theories 
The concept of ‘consumer engagement’, or ‘customer engagement’, or ‘customer brand 
engagement’ has been extensively discussed in the marketing theories particularly since 
2010.67 Therefore, marketing theories will be fairly pertinent to the analysis of this article. 
However, the meaning of the concept is rather multi-faceted probably because the concept has 
been approached in a variety of contexts. 68 At its core, customer engagement reflects the 
idea of customer activism: customers do not just passively consume products and/or services 
but also interact with their suppliers in a proactive manner.69 Earlier discussion of customer 
 
65 See infra s. 4.6.3. 
66 OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy (2015), supra n. 34, at 26, para.32. 
67 K. Żyminkowska, Customer Engagement in Theory and Practice A Marketing Management Perspective 24 (1st 
ed. 2019, Palgrave Pivot 2019); L. Hollebeek, Exploring Customer Brand Engagement: Definition and Themes, 
19(7) Journal of strategic Marketing 555 (2011). 
68 Żyminkowska, supra n. 67, at 24; Hollebeek, supra n. 67. 
69 Żyminkowska, supra n. 67, at 1; Hollebeek, supra n. 67, at 555. 
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activism centers on the phenomenon of value co-creation for which ‘consumers become 
active to help personally improve or design the goods and services of the marketplace for 
themselves or other customers’.70 In this sense, it appears that the concept of consumer 
engagement echoes the value creation principle that underlies the user participation proposal. 
Nonetheless, marketing theorists gradually accept a more comprehensive approach to the 
concept that can be defined as ‘the level of a customer’s cognitive, emotional and behavioral 
investment in specific brand interactions’.71  Regardless of its various forms, from the 
enterprise’s perspective, consumer engagement serves the purpose of creating and 
strengthening customer loyalty to specific brands.72 In this context, value creation is just a 
means rather than the end. Based on this broader perspective, it can be inferred that consumer 
engagement can be created and developed through a variety of ways including, inter alia, 
advertising, customer-friendly services, promotion, and channels of distribution. Indeed, most 
branding efforts by companies serve the purpose of fostering such consumer engagement.73 
To summarize, while consumer engagement is more than mere market accesses in that 
significant effort of consumer marketing and branding is required, it is nevertheless broader 
than the concept of value co-creation.  
3.5 Interim conclusion 
This section examines the legal (and moral) rationale for the UA and its scope limitations, 
arguing that, among different theories, the benefit theory qualifies as an ideal conceptual basis 
for the UA as well as the entire international tax framework. Unlike the user participation 
proposal and the PE regime, both of which emphasize the supply side of the business, the 
benefit theory acknowledges that benefits can exist on both the supply and demand sides. This 
broader perspective lends support to the reallocation of taxing rights to market jurisdictions 
independent of the existence of a physical presence in those jurisdictions. That being said, a 
well-formulated benefit theory rejects the idea that mere market accesses can create a tax 
nexus. Benefits must be of a significant degree and exploited by businesses in an active and 
sustained manner. This qualification justifies the engagement requirement in defining the 
scope of the new taxing right in the UA. 
4. ASSESSING CARVE-OUTS AND BORDER CASES REGARDING THE UA 
SCOPE  
 
70 Żyminkowska, supra n. 67, at 3. 
71 Hollebeek, supra n. 67, at 555. 
72 Ibid. at 555. 
73 For the relationship (and their difference) between branding and customer engagement, see Ibid. at 563. 
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4.1 Introduction 
As was discussed in Section 2.2, a number of business sectors or models are carved out from 
the scope of Amount A. In addition, several special business types are highlighted by the UA 
documents for special consideration. All of these carve-outs and special cases relate to the 
context of consumer-facing businesses. 
4.2 Carve-out in respect of sales of intermediate products and components 
The UA documents do not clarify the rationale for such industrial products being excluded 
from the UA scope. Arguably, as long as intermediate products and components are sold from 
a non-resident MNE to an enterprise and incorporated into the finished products by that 
purchasing enterprise, it is the latter enterprise rather than the former that engages the final 
consumers. In particular, products sold by original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) bear no 
brand of their own.74 While it is true that industrial suppliers can, and many times do, engage 
their immediate business customers through marketing activities, such B2B marketing is more 
targeted and hence less likely to engage large ‘client bases’ as opposed to the B2C model.75 
In addition, it is more difficult for B2B suppliers to exploit their clients who are usually 
professional buyers. Indeed, like OEMs, a B2B supplier is more likely to be exploited by a 
client that sells branded finished products.76 Last, but not the least, compared with the B2C 
model, B2B marketing features greater reliance on targeted promotion methods such as 
discount or customer entertainment.77 Such benefits will usually be included in the taxable 
income of either the purchasing enterprise or its employee who receives the benefits (if they 
are legitimate benefits instead of bribes), both of which are typically taxpayers who are 
resident to the market jurisdiction.78 It follows that, for sales of industrial commodities, either 
the non-resident enterprises do not acquire significant benefits from the market jurisdictions, 
or those jurisdictions can well satisfy their fiscal interests by taxing the domestic purchasing 
enterprises, or both.  
Based on the above reasoning, it can be further argued that the same carve-out can be 
 
74 An original equipment manufacturer (OEM) is traditionally defined as a company for which their goods are 
used as components in the products of another company which subsequently sells the finished item to users. C. 
Doyle, A Dictionary of Marketing 67 (4th ed., Oxford University Press 2016). 
75 N. K. Malhotra, C. Uslay & A. Bayraktar, Relationship Marketing Re-Imagined: Marketing’s Inevitable Shift 
from Exchanges to Value Cocreating Relationships 66-67 (Business Expert Press 2016). 
76 R. M. Cortez & W. J. Johnston, The Future of B2B Marketing Theory: A Historical and Prospective Analysis, 
66 Industrial Marketing Management 90, 90 (2017). 
77 Malhotra, Uslay, & Bayraktar, supra n. 75, at 66-67; Cortez and Johnston, supra n. 76, at 90. 
78 For taxation of employment income regarding gifts from clients, see A. Lymer & L. Oats, Taxation: Policy and 
Practice 2019/20 26th Edition 2019 161 (Fiscal Publications 2019). 
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extended to most B2B sales.79 For instance, sales from an OEM to its business clients almost 
certainly should be excluded for the UA purpose even if the commodities that are involved in 
a transaction per se are finished products without the need for substantial processing by the 
clients. A related concern is that certain commodities seem to be suited for both B2B and B2C 
transactions, such as office equipment for general purposes. Some suggest that this type of 
businesses would be either within or beyond the scope of Amount A depending on the relative 
portion of B2C and B2B sales. In contrast, others suggest having the UA apply only to its 
B2C segments.80 These authors prefer the second approach since the key issue is about the 
nature of the transactions rather than the nature of the commodities. Similarly, the sales of 
pharmaceutical products to the professional medical institutions that are mentioned in Section 
2.3 should be regarded as B2B transactions and hence carved out from the UA scope even 
though most of these products bear the brands of the original manufacturers throughout the 
entire supply chain up to the final consumers.  
4.3 Carve-out in respect of financial services   
According to the IF Statement, the grounds for carving out financial services are twofold. 
First, most of the activities of the financial services sector occur with commercial businesses 
and should therefore be classified as B2B transactions.81 This line of reasoning supports the 
view mentioned above that the grounds for carving out industrial products are associated with 
the nature of the transactions rather than the products. Second, even for the sector's 
consumer-facing business lines such as retail banks and insurance, consideration should be 
given to the fact that market jurisdictions typically impose licensing requirements upon 
incoming foreign financial enterprises so as to protect local deposit/policy holders. 
Accordingly, it could be said that the residual profits of non-resident financial companies are 
largely realized in local consumer markets.82 However, as the IF Statement recognizes, there 
may be retail financial businesses that are not subject to licensing requirements, such as 
digital peer-to-peer lending platforms that may still be covered by the UA.83 
4.4 Special considerations for sales through third-party intermediaries 
4.4.1 Intermediary sales and the B2B model 
On the surface, it appears that intermediary sales should be carved out from the UA scope 
 
79 Except for sales through non-routine distributors, see infra s. 4.4.2. 
80 INSIGHT, supra n. 27. 
81 OECD, Statement by the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS on the Two-Pillar Approach to Address the 
Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalization of the Economy, supra n. 1, at 11, para. 31. 
82 Ibid. at 11, para. 31. 
83 Ibid. at 11, para. 31. 
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altogether as, by its definition, sales to third-party intermediaries constitute a typical B2B 
business model. In particular, if the commodities resold by an intermediary bear the latter’s 
brand, then the manufacturer of the commodities would be nothing but an OEM, and hence 
the sales can hardly be regarded as a type of consumer-facing business. On other occasions, 
suppliers may retain their brands throughout the channels of distribution yet impose very little 
control over the channels – they simply sell the commodities to the intermediaries. In such 
cases, while the sales made by the suppliers may amount to a type of consumer-facing 
business, the suppliers can hardly be said to have developed active and significant 
engagement with the large consumer bases in a market jurisdiction. It is rather the 
intermediaries who actively engage their local consumers and thereby capture a reasonable 
portion of the profits generated from such an engagement. 
The situation may become more complicated when a supplier wants to control the way in 
which the intermediaries resell the commodities, as typified in distribution arrangements. In 
addition to the transfer of ownership as is seen in a sales contract, a typical distribution 
agreement also stipulates that the intermediary (distributor) accepts certain obligations and 
restrictions in relation to its advertising and the selling of the products bearing the supplier’s 
brand name. In return, the supplier agrees, for example, to confer the distributor the exclusive 
rights to sell in the relevant territory.84 In such cases, the supplier’s engagement with the final 
consumers is strengthened rather than disrupted by hiring a third-party intermediary. That 
being said, consideration should be given to the fact that those intermediaries are normally 
remunerated an arm’s length reward by their suppliers. In this context, the benefits from the 
sustained and significant engagement with large customer bases in market jurisdictions are at 
least partially captured by the intermediary enterprises and thus already subject to the taxation 
of the market jurisdictions. The situation is reminiscent of the PE rules stipulated in income 
tax treaties. Specifically, if a non-resident enterprise carries on its businesses in a source state 
through a dependent agent (DA) – such agents approach local customers on behalf of their 
principals without bearing substantial business risks – then it is deemed that the enterprise has 
a dependent agent PE (DAPE) in the source state. It follows that two types of profit will be 
allocated to the source state: one is the arm’s length remuneration of the DA which is 
typically a resident enterprise in the source state, and the other is some extra profit of the 
non-resident enterprise that is attributable to the DAPE. However, if the non-resident 
enterprise conducts its businesses in the source state via an independent agent – such agents 
are typically the distributors discussed above – then the DAPE will not arise, and only the 
 
84 A. Mavrikakis et al., Business Law and Practice 2018/2019 879 (College of Law Publishing 2018). 
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distributors’ profit from such intermediary sales will be subject to source taxation.85 Arguably, 
the policy rationale for this discriminatory treatment between dependent and independent 
agents is that the former only acts as a tool for its principal and procures a limited portion of 
the profit whereas the latter conducts its own businesses and is fully remunerated for the 
entrepreneurial risks that it shoulders.       
4.4.2 Sales through routine-function distributors   
From the above reasoning, it seems that the UA makes a mistake by including sales through 
third-party intermediaries in its scope. Nonetheless, these authors take the view that the UA 
does have legitimate grounds to cover a particular set of distribution arrangements for which 
the distributors ‘only perform routine tasks such as minor assembly and packaging’ in 
reselling the commodities.86 Such routine-function distributors are indeed reminiscent of 
DAPEs except for the mere fact that the former bear the business risks in relation to the 
transfer of the ownership of the commodities. It follows that such distributors would only earn 
some meager remuneration as opposed to full-fledged distributors and that most of the profits 
generated from the supply chain would be kept by the non-resident suppliers.  
For such in-scope intermediary sales, many raise a practical question as to the identification 
of the location of final consumers. Imagine the scenario in which such distributors not only 
resell the goods locally but also to foreign markets, or they further contract with 
sub-distributors who are either wholesalers or retailers. Then how can it be determined if a 
non-resident supplier has generated above-threshold revenue from the large consumer base in 
a particular marketing jurisdiction? In these authors’ view, this question may not be as 
troublesome as first expected. This is because in-scope intermediary sales are confined to 
arrangements with routine-function distributors, most of which are, arguably, local retailers. 
Otherwise, if a distributor also exploits foreign markets or further contracts with 
sub-distributors to promote its sales, it has indeed engaged in entrepreneurial activities (e.g. 
developing its own channels) and will thus be rewarded ‘extraordinarily’.  
4.4.3 Evidence of sustained and significant engagement 
Another question may arise regarding the ‘plus’ evidence of sustained and significant 
engagement developed by an MNE since a mere revenue threshold is insufficient for 
consumer-facing businesses to create UA nexuses. While the UA documents suggest that such 
 
85 OECD Model Convention (2017), Arts 5, 7; L. Oats, A. Miller & E. Mulligan, Principles of International 
Taxation 247-248, 272-273 (6th ed., Bloomsbury Professional 2017). 
86 OECD, Statement by the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS on the Two-Pillar Approach to Address the 
Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalization of the Economy, supra n. 1, at 11, para. 25. 
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plus factors can be, for example, the existence of a physical presence of the MNE in the 
market jurisdiction or targeted advertising directed at those jurisdictions, the search for such 
evidence may become quite problematic. First, there may be difficulties for tax lawyers to 
identify if the MNE’s advertisements are targeting a specific market jurisdiction. According to 
recent marketing studies, the digitalization of the economy increases the transparency of 
marketing activities that do not necessarily need to target any particular market:87 ‘Online 
shoppers even in the remotest parts of countries such as China or India know a lot about a 
global brand’s attributes and pricing worldwide, without ever having seen the product in a 
physical store.’ 88 
As to the existence of a physical presence, an MNE selling their commodities through 
third-party intermediaries may very likely lack any physical presence in relevant market 
jurisdictions. Notwithstanding this, these authors take the view that, for in-scope distribution 
arrangements, things do not need to be so complicated as the very fact that an MNE arranges 
routine-function distributors to help distribute its commodities to final consumers in itself 
demonstrates the MNE’s active exploitation of the destination market. This is similar to the 
case of the DAPE where a non-resident enterprise actively exploits the market of a source 
country using a DA as a tool. Therefore, for in-scope distribution arrangements, the existence 
of a UA nexus will be deemed once an MNE generates above-threshold revenue from the 
consumer-facing business carried on in the market jurisdiction. This presumption may be 
rebutted if, for example, the MNE is able to prove that it makes no extra branding effort at the 
international level in addition to the distribution arrangements.  
4.5 Carve-out in respect of extractive industries 
According to the UA documents, extractive industries are carved out from the scope of 
Amount A for the reason that products such as natural resources and raw materials are usually 
of a generic character, and the prices of these products are generally determined by their 
internal characteristics.89 However, the caveat is that disputes may arise as to whether a 
certain type of commodity is of generic quality. Consider agriculture, for example, for which, 
while a significant part of the sector involves unbranded commodities delivered in bulk, 
attention should be paid to the increasing branding efforts in relation to those niche 
 
87 J. Steenkamp, Global Brand Building and Management in the Digital Age, 28(1) Journal of International 
Marketing 13, 19-20 (2020). 
88 Ibid. at 19-20. 
89 OECD, Statement by the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS on the Two-Pillar Approach to Address the 
Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalization of the Economy, supra n. 1, at 11, para.30. 
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agricultural or horticultural products.90 The IF Statement attempts to differentiate generic 
agricultural commodities from non-generic food industries using the example of the coffee 
industry: ‘the sale of sacks of green coffee beans will not be within the scope of the new taxing 
right, whereas the sale of branded jars of coffee will be’.91 
However, the proposition appears to have eschewed the fact that myriads of consumers today 
also purchase branded jars of coffee beans to ‘DIY’ their coffee. Another example is mineral 
water sold in bottles with different brands – suppliers of such bottled water often boast that 
their products are ‘purely natural’ with minimal human intervention.   
Arguably, extractive industries can be better dealt with under the B2B carve-out. If certain 
types of products are of a generic character, such as raw material, they will normally be 
transacted either as intermediate products being incorporated into finished products or 
through wholesale intermediaries; and both channels are carved out from the UA scope. On 
the contrary, if certain extractive products – e.g. raw coffee beans or mineral water – are sold 
to consumers directly by the suppliers, then these products will most likely be branded and 
thus lose their generality.  
4.6 Special considerations for franchises  
4.6.1 Policy rationale 
The IF Statement tentatively proposes to bring into scope ‘businesses that generate revenue 
from licensing rights over trademarked consumer products and businesses’, such as under a 
franchise model.92 Under this model, a franchisor licenses the use of its business model, 
brand, and the rights to sell its branded products/services to a franchisee, which is also known 
as a satellite business. In return, the franchisee pays royalties to the franchisor and agrees to 
comply with certain obligations that are typically set out in a franchise agreement.93 
Generally, the non-resident franchisor specializes in developing market intangibles – i.e. 
engaging their consumers remotely – whereas the local franchisee is responsible for 
physically producing and delivering goods/services to the consumers. The royalties, therefore, 
reflect the franchisor’s profit that is generated from its sustained and significant engagement 
with the consumer base in the market jurisdiction. Hence, the situation squarely fits the UA 
purpose.    
 
90 B. Walsh, Marketing Agricultural Products and Services, 56 (Tocal College, NSW DPI 2015).   
91 OECD, Statement by the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS on the Two-Pillar Approach to Address the 
Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalization of the Economy, supra n. 1, at 11, para.30. 
92 Ibid. at 11, para.27. 
93 Doyle, supra n. 74, at 41. 
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4.6.2 Taxation over royalties 
Despite the above reasoning, it should be borne in mind that income over royalties has 
already been dealt with through the articles of royalty in most income tax treaties. While it is 
true that Article 12 of the OECD Model assigns the taxing right over royalty exclusively to 
the state where the beneficial owner of the royalty is a resident, many treaties accord with the 
counterpart article in the UN Model that permits the source state to withhold part of the 
cross-border payment of royalties made to non-resident taxpayers. In the latter case, it could 
also be said, just as with the situation of the financial services sector discussed above, that the 
residual profits of the non-resident franchisor are largely realized in the market jurisdictions.94 
Therefore, the new taxing right in the UA with respect to franchise arrangements can be 
realized by modifying the article of royalty in the existing tax treaties to the effect that 
royalties in relation to licensing rights over trademarked consumer businesses are exclusively 
taxed by the source state, typically the state where the trademark is used. It is worth noting 
that this place-of-use rule has long been established in US treaty practice on taxation over 
royalties.95 
4.6.3 Theoretical insights drawn from the franchise arrangement  
The franchise arrangements shed some intriguing light on the UA and its underlying theory. 
Specifically, in such arrangements, franchisors usually do not access the markets of source 
states as far as the consumer-facing goods/services are concerned. It is the local franchisees 
that provide such commodities to final consumers. Accordingly, the royalties almost purely 
reflect the franchisors’ benefits from their remote yet significant engagement with the large 
consumer bases in the market jurisdictions – market accesses are irrelevant in this situation.96 
This means that, for the purpose of the benefit theory, the distinction between the access to a 
market, on the one hand, and an active and sustained exploitation of large customer/user bases 
on the other hand is not only theoretically substantial but also practically observable. 
4.7 Comments 
4.7.1 Grounds for carve-outs: product-based or channel-based? 
On the surface, the UA sets out two types of carve-outs: those based on product (or service) 
types such as carve-outs in respect of extractive products, industrial goods, and financial 
 
94 See supra s. 4.3. 
95 R. S. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law: An Analysis of the International Tax Regime 44 
(Cambridge University Press 2007). 
96 For simplification, it is assumed that the franchisor do not provide technical assistance, or know-how on 
manufacturing processes, or any intellectual property other than the trademark to the franchisee.  
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services; and those based on channel patterns including the carve-out regarding intermediary 
sales. However, the analysis in this section shows that, ultimately, it is the channel pattern that 
matters the most in determining whether certain business falls within or beyond the UA scope. 
This is because the choice of channel strategy by MNEs dictates the choice of branding tactics 
and the way of allocating profits among channel members, both of which are key factors in 
determining whether an MNE acquires a significant degree of benefits from a market 
jurisdiction.97  This ‘channel thinking’ was also recommended by a stakeholder in his 
feedback on the Secretariat Proposal: ‘we do not think that the classification of whether a 
business is consumer or commercial facing should be based on the type of goods or services 
sold. Instead, we believe that the scoping should take its outset in the type of transaction in 
terms transactional party and key value drivers.’ 98    
4.7.2 What is left for the UA? 
From the above analysis, it could be derived that most of the B2B sales – except for the sales 
through routine-function distributors and franchise arrangements (which can be dealt with, 
however, through the treaty rules over royalties) – should be carved out from the UA scope. 
Accordingly, there would only be two sets of businesses left within the in-scope 
consumer-facing business: sales through routine-function distributors and B2C sales via 
online channels. For the former set, Section 4.4.3 established that the creation of a UA nexus 
will be deemed once an MNE meets the revenue threshold since the arrangement with 
routine-function distributors in itself indicates the MNE’s active engagement with the 
consumer bases in the market jurisdictions. Thus, what remains at issue is whether any plus 
evidence (in addition to the revenue threshold) is required for B2C sales to create the nexus 
for the UA purpose. This issue can be illuminated by the significant economic presence 
proposal as was discussed in Section 3.1. Specifically, for an online B2C business to meet the 
revenue threshold, the MNE would usually be involved in one or more of the following 
activities: (1) the maintenance of a website in a local language; (2) responsibility for the final 
delivery of goods to customers or the provision by the enterprise of other support services 
such as after-sales services or repairs and maintenance; (3) sustained marketing and sales 
promotion activities, either online or otherwise to attract customers; (4) billing and collection 
in local currency or with a local form of payment; and (5) deriving large volumes of digital 
 
97 Channel of distribution is a key component of companies’ branding strategies. Rajagopal, Competitive Branding 
Strategies: Managing Performance in Emerging Markets, 154-157 (1st ed.,, Palgrave Macmillan 2019). 
98 AB Volvo in Public comments received on the Secretariat Proposal for a “Unified Approach” under Pillar One, 
supra n. 6. 
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contents or other data from the consumer bases.99 Therefore, for online B2C sales to exceed 
the revenue threshold, a certain level of sustained and significant engagement or the 
‘significant economic presence’ would almost be unavoidable. That being said, this 
presumption can be rebutted in a few circumstances, as in the sales through routine 
distributors. For example, an MNE may prove that its online sales are mostly realized via its 
Amazon shop; the fulfillment of the sales contracts (e.g. the delivery of the goods) is also 
performed by Amazon. Indeed, in the context that Amazon engages in significant marketing 
activities in order to earn internet traffic for the sellers registered with its online platform in 
return for the fees from those sellers, this platform company is more like a non-routine 
distributor. As was discussed in Section 4.4.1, sales through non-routine distributors should be 
carved out from the UA scope. 
4.7.3 Automated digital services: product-based or channel-based? 
By far, the discussions of scope limitations for the UA purpose has been focused on 
consumer-facing businesses as apposed to automated digital services that are believed to be 
intrinsically ‘consumer-engaged’. However, the above-mentioned Amazon example may also 
apply to digital businesses. Consider a provider of digital books or digital music selling its 
products through an Amazon shop; for the same reason, the sales would not create a UA 
nexus even if the revenue threshold is satisfied. In these authors’ view, automated digital 
services can also be considered from the perspective of channel thinking. Such businesses are 
included in the UA scope because of the very fact that they are primarily conducted through 
online channels. In particular, for digital platforms, their interaction with consumers/users is 
so salient that a mere revenue threshold will be sufficient for creating nexuses for the UA 
purpose. For B2C sales of digital goods or services, by contrast, the existence of UA nexuses 
can only be deemed if the revenue threshold is met. Again, the presumption can be rebutted if, 
for example, an MNE can prove that its digital goods/services are distributed via a third-party 
online platform that engages in non-routine marketing activities and imposes a significant 
portion of fees upon its registered sellers.                 
5. CONCLUSION  
This article focuses on the scope limitations of the new taxing right in the UA. The question 
boils down to the policy rationale for such new taxing rights. These authors argue that a 
narrowly-construed version of the benefit theory provides a proper conceptual foundation for 
 
99 OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy(2019), supra n. 34, at 16, para.51. 
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the new taxing right and its scope limitation. Based on the benefit theory and marketing 
theories, it has been further argued that whether certain types of businesses should be carved 
out from the UA should be determined mainly by the channel strategies adopted by such 
businesses. More specifically, this article proposes to confine the UA scope to three sets of 
business: (1) businesses of digital platforms; (2) most of the online B2C sales; and (3) a small 
part of B2B sales (i.e. consumer-facing businesses conducted through routine-function 
distributors). For all of these business types, the mere creation of the above threshold revenue 
by MNEs from the businesses carried on in the market jurisdictions over a period of years 
would be sufficient either for creating a UA nexus (e.g. for digital platforms) or for tax 
authorities or courts to deem the existence of such nexuses (e.g. for B2C sales and B2B sales 
in relation to routine-function distributors). In this way, the issue of the scope of limitation for 
the UA can be significantly simplified.   
The finding should not be surprising that, except for the ‘thin’ sector regarding the sales 
through routine-function distributors, the proposed scope for the UA would overlap with the 
scope of significant economic presence proposal almost entirely. This overlap is reasonable 
because, after all, the major tax challenge of digitalization regarding tax jurisdiction is, as 
stated in the significant economic presence proposal, that the use of digital technologies has 
increasingly enabled MNEs to carry out large scale businesses in market jurisdictions without 
deploying physical presence or hiring local channels in the markets.  
    
  
